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Many studies have been devoted to understanding the consequence of ignition events that 
could occur as a result of using hydrogen as an alternative to fossil fuels or when 
hydrogen is present in large scale industrial or nuclear waste sites. Little attention has 
however, been given to the effect of explosion in small scale operations: this could 
involve service work with manual handling and manipulation of gas containing packages 
or vessels. The purpose of this study is to begin to address this knowledge gap and report the 
results of an experimental program carried out to simulate the effect of localised and weakly 
confined small volume hydrogen explosions on personal safety. Three aspects of personal 
injury consequences are considered; injury from shock loading to the head/brain, skin 
burns and acoustic/hearing damage. It is concluded from ignition and acoustic noise 
exposure experiments, carried with stoichiometric hydrogen /air mixtures, that injuries 
arising from shock loading or burns to the skin are less likely than hearing damage. It is 
suggested that further work should focus on the noise exposure and hearing damage 
effects of small scale explosions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Much has been written in recent years about the future of hydrogen as an alternative to 
fossil fuels [1-10] and the challenges that ensue concerning safety aspects involving 
hydrogen containment or storage. These safety aspects are also of great importance in the 
context of nuclear decommissioning operations where hydrogen issues arise due to the 
corrosion of nuclear waste [11-14].  
 
The much lower density of hydrogen than air gives it a large degree of buoyancy so that 
in this respect it can be considered to be inherently safer than other flammable gases in 
unconstrained and well ventilated spaces. On the other hand, the wide flammability range 
of the gas in air makes the likelihood of ignition greater. Zhang and Li [1] compared the 
explosion characteristics of large volume hydrogen, propane and methane clouds at the 
stoichiometric concentration. As would be expected, the hydrogen/air cloud explosion 
was found to have the highest peak overpressure with the overpressure rising at the 
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nearby locality of the cloud boundary. The dynamic pressure of the cloud explosion was 
found to be of similar order to the overpressure and the explosion/flame region 
approximately 1.25 times the original width of the cloud. Dadashzadeh et al. [2] have 
recently provided a risk assessment methodology for onboard hydrogen-powered vehicle 
storage. The fire risk is defined in terms of "cost of human life per vehicle fire, and 
annual fatality rate per vehicle". Hazard distances were calculated for blast wave and 
fireball following a catastrophic storage tank rupture. They found that the resulting fire 
acts in all directions with larger hazard distances in comparison with a jet fire.  
 
An evaluation of the common hazards associated with hydrogen storage facilities and 
distribution systems was carried out by Rigas and Sklavounos [3]. They reported that 
their hazard analysis had shown that hydrogen ignition can result in accidents that "pose a 
severe threat for property and public safety". Interestingly, they also found that the 
resulting cloud arising from liquefied hydrogen spillage behaves as a heavy gas rather 
than a light one with flammable concentrations remaining at low heights above the 
ground. Particular safety concerns have been highlighted where H2 fuel cells have 
replaced lead-acid batteries for industrial forklift operation [4]. Safely refuelling these 
trucks with compressed hydrogen in a confined space offers new challenges and requires 
further operational considerations. In their experiments, Ekoto et al. [4], used a sub-scale 
test facility (45 m3 internal volume) with Froude scale-up calculations to simulate the 
release of 0.8 kg H2 into a 1000 m
3 enclosure. Dispersion measurements showed that the 
transient release plume first became a momentum guided jet (relatively insensitive to 
buoyancy) which quickly diverted upwards as the storage tank pressure decreased. 
Tanaka et al. [5] have carried out an experimental study on hydrogen explosions in a full-
scale hydrogen filling station. High pressure hydrogen was released into the storage room 
in the full-scale model of the refuelling station. Igniting the releases showed that the 
overpressures generated had a clear correlation with the timing of ignition and distance 
from the ignition point.    
 
Many studies have been devoted to understanding the likelihood and consequence of 
ignition events that could occur in large scale industrial or nuclear waste sites. For 
example, in a recent paper, Averill et al. [14] examined how Bayesian networks could be 
used to represent and understand potential ignition scenarios in nuclear waste 
decommissioning. In the work, prediction of the hydrogen concentration produced by 
corroding pyrophoric material contained in large stacked storage boxes was explored and 
related to a number of operational parameters. However, in contrast to the large-scale or 
relatively large-scale ignition and safety studies carried out, little attention has been given 
to the effect of ignition in small scale operations such as service work involving manual 
manipulation of gas containing packages or vessels. A great deal of personal operational 
intervention may be required in practical processing rather than the use of remote, 
engineered systems. In one nuclear processing scenario for example, a rebottling activity 
for analytical purposes requires that operators in air fed suits pick up and move 
packages/bottles that contain hydrogen. There is an increasing interest in the personal 
injury consequences of ignition of small volumes of gas containing hydrogen during such 
operations. These may result from localised hydrogen leaks released to air with an 
external ignition source or through an internal ignition source that results in deflagration 
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of the contained flammable gas mixture. Concerning this ‘hands on’ processing activity, 
conventional/personal safety management must be considered to be of the greatest 
importance. Although there have been reports and discussions on the effects of 
explosions on the body (e.g. in the Oklahoma City bombing [15]) the consequence of 
exposure to ignition of small volumes of localized flammable hydrogen leaks is difficult 
to estimate theoretically and there appears to be little industrial evidence or literature to 
refer to. 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to address this knowledge gap and to report the results of an 
experimental program carried out to simulate the effect of localised (weakly confined) 
small volume hydrogen explosions on personal safety.  Of particular importance is 
identifying the most serious consequences that require further study.  
 
 
2. Potential hazards 
 
With any explosion event there are several ways in which injury could be caused to 
people in its proximity. These can be categorised as being due to the effects of the 
blast/shock wave or the resulting flying fragments/projectiles, burns or hearing damage. 
Many of the issues involved have been examined in other studies but these have typically 
been on much larger scales or involved small high explosive charges producing shock 
waves much greater than produced by weakly confined hydrogen gas explosions. One 
approach in determining the effect of an explosion is to make a comparison with 
published data on the basis of TNT equivalence but the fraction of the TNT equivalence 
value actually realised in an unconfined or mostly unconfined explosion is only a few % 
of the destructive effect indicated by the equivalence value. It would be very unclear as to 
what fraction should be assumed in the case of a small gas filled bag of a few litres. A 
better indication of explosive energy in this case is to take account of the equivalence 
ratio () of the hydrogen gas mixture since an equivalence ratio of 1 corresponds to peak 
overpressure in an enclosed volume. Although  = 1 does not correspond to the 
concentration at which the maximum burning velocity occurs it can be considered to be 
(or close to being) a worse case scenario regarding blast pressure and acoustic noise.   
 
One area of the body that is particularly prone to suffer serious injury from shock loading 
is the head/brain. The shock loading could result either from the blast itself or from a 
projectile impacting the head. This has been investigated in a number of different 
contexts such as traffic collisions, sporting injuries and blast suits for improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) [16]. The likelihood of serious injury is related to both the 
magnitude and duration of the g-force experienced. Based on this, one of the earliest and 
most widely used measures for head injury is the Wayne State Tolerance Curve [17], 
shown in Figure 1. This in turn has led to the development of criteria such as the Head 
Injury Criterion (HIC). A full discussion of the sensitivity of the various biomechanical 
measures of head impact (rotational and linear acceleration, impact duration and location) 
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Figure 1 The Wayne State Tolerance Curve defines an injury threshold based on the onset of 
skull fracture.  
 
Another area of major concern is that of burns. The conditions necessary to cause burns (i.e.              
temperature and time) are well known. Damage to the skin with 1st degree burns begins once 
the temperature of the basal layer (deepest layer of the five layers of the epidermis) reaches 
44°C. Should the basal layer reach 72°C then the skin will be destroyed instantly [19]. 
However, in the case of nuclear or industrial process workers likely to be exposed to effects 
from ignition of small volumes of hydrogen, it is highly unlikely that direct impingement of 
flames onto bare skin would occur. Workers should invariably be wearing protective 
equipment, typically air-fed suits of polymeric material covering the entire body for 
radiological protection. In a small localised hydrogen explosion, High flame temperatures 
will be generated (2000°C) but only for a very short period of time (typically <0.1 s). This 
raises the important question of whether the heat flux and its duration would be sufficient to 
ignite/damage the film and burn the skin directly or instead permit enough heat transfer 
through the intact film to damage skin underneath.  
 
Hearing damage is a significant concern following any explosion and often occurs in 
situations where persons are otherwise uninjured. The human hearing system is an 
extremely delicate and sensitive detector of pressure fluctuations in the air. Despite its 
large range of detection, high levels of impulsive sound arising from explosions or 
industrial processes can carry excessive acoustics energy posing a considerable risk to the 
hearing system of the person exposed. Instant damage can occur to the middle and/or and 
inner ear from high level impulsive sounds resulting in permanent hearing loss. 
In the European Union, the Directive 2003/10/EC (noise)† stipulates the minimum health 
and safety requirements regarding the exposure of workers to the risks arising or likely to 
arise from noise and in particular the risk to hearing. The Directive defines the physical 
parameters that serve as risk predictors in noise exposure assessments. The C-weighted 
peak sound pressure level (LCpeak) is specified as the parameter to be used for measuring 
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and assessing noise exposure from impulsive sound sources. It also designates legal 
obligations for employers when certain exposure limit levels of those parameters are  
reached or exceeded. Under the Directive, employers are required to implement a 
programme of technical and organizational measures to reduce the level of exposure if an 
employee is likely to be exposed to sounds measuring LCpeak of 137 dB or above. An 
absolute limit is placed at 140 dB which must not be exceeded. Only for this limit can the 
reduction afforded by hearing protection be taken into account in the exposure 
assessment.  
 
Impulsive noise sources investigated previously have included fireworks as well as 
various kinds of weapons and explosive devices. Of particular relevance is the study of 
acoustical characterisation of exploding hydrogen-oxygen balloon carried out by Vernon 
and Gee [20]. In this study, balloons of 23 l capacity were filled with varying amounts of  
hydrogen and oxygen and then ignited in an anechoic chamber  using a small butane 
torch attached to a metre stick. Although the issue of hearing damage was not directly 
addressed, acoustic data was collected over a spherical surface geometry at a radial 
distance of mostly 1.83 m. At this distance, the lowest Lpeak value
‡ measured was 126.1 
dB with a balloon containing 1.98 l of hydrogen in the absence of oxygen. The highest 
Lpeak value (161.5 dB) found was for a balloon filled with 22.1 l of stoichiometric mixture 
of hydrogen/oxygen. It was also observed that balloons filled with pure hydrogen showed 
more variability in the results obtained whereas the balloons that also contained oxygen 
produced more consistent sound levels that grew with the balloon size.  
 
It is expected that because of the need for process workers to closely inspect and visually 
examine packages for degradation, the head would be at most risk and potentially 
subjected to the full force of any explosion blast. For this reason, to carry out an 
experimental program which would throw most light on the personal damage and injury 
likely to be caused by a small localized hydrogen gas explosion, it was decided that 
measurements should be made using an exploding gas sac or balloon in the proximity of 
a simulated human head. The following parameters were considered most important for 
measurement; force and movement experienced by the simulated head mass, blast 
pressure and noise exposure levels, and surface temperatures in the facial region. To 
represent a worse case scenario, all tests were carried out with a stoichiometric hydrogen 
/air mixture ( = 1). 
 
3. Experimental Apparatus  
 
The experimental apparatus was assembled as shown in Figure 2.  
 
                                                 






Figure 2. Schematic diagram of exploding sac/balloon test apparatus  
 
A 30% (v/v) stoichiometric hydrogen/ air gas mixture was supplied to the sac/balloons 
from a blending panel through a solenoid valve that could be operated remotely. 
Polyethylene zip-tie plastic sacs or heavy duty seam welded PVC sacs (supplied by 
Sellafield Ltd) were sealed in the deflated condition and filled through an inserted 
hypodermic needle. The latex composition balloons used in the tests were directly filled 
through a nozzle with the gas mixture to the required volume and sealed. To initiate an 
explosion, a small propane blow torch was used attached to a 2 m long rod, the flame 
allowed to contact the sac/balloon surface in a position outside of the line of the 
measuring devices. Attempts to use an electric arc from a 10kV ignition transformer for 
this purpose proved unsuitable on account of the electrical noise produced interfering 
with the triggering and measurement systems. The ignition events were recorded with 
high speed digital imaging using an Olympus i-speed camera at 1000 fps.  
 
Pendulum and accelerometer for simulated head movement 
 
A ballistic pendulum was constructed to proximately simulate a workers head. It 
consisted of a circular plate (230 mm diameter) attached by a threaded rod in its center to 
a steel bar (200 mm x 40 mm x 5 mm thick). The pendulum was suspended, from a 
height of 1.25 m to the centre of the plate, by 3 steel cables; two attached to the plate and 
the third to the bar at the rear. Initial tests were conducted using a 6 mm thick steel 
circular plate (1.9 kg) with a centrally attached 100 mm diameter steel disk of mass 2.5 
kg. Together with the rod and bar this gave a total mass of 5 kg which is comparable to 
the mass of a human head. In later tests this was reduced by using a 5 mm thick Perspex 
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disk to give a total mass of 0.8 kg. A marker was applied to the edge of each disk to 
enable its movement to be tracked during analysis of the high speed digital imaging. 
  
Attached to the threaded rod, immediately behind the back of the disk was a single axis ± 
250 g accelerometer (EVAL-ADXL001-250Z) operating at 5V to give a specified output 
of 6.7 mV/g. A 75kHz low pass filter was attached to the output and a differential op-amp 
circuit used to remove the zero bias voltage. 
  
Pressure transducer for blast measurement 
             
To record blast pressure levels, a Honeywell piezoresistive 26PCAFA6D 0 to 1 psi, (0 to 
6895 Pa) differential pressure transducer was used that enabled a maximum measurement 
response time of 1ms. One of the outlets of the differential transducer was exited through 
a rigid pipe to the atmosphere at a distance of 5m from the blast so that it was referenced 
to normal atmospheric pressure. The position of the transducer and its orientation was 
varied as shown in Figure 2, placed in one of two positions to give either a general in line 
record of the blast pressure (A) or a direct indication of the pressure close to the 
pendulum (B. i.e. the human head position). Output from the transducer was amplified 
using a Burr Brown INA125 instrumentation amplifier and precision voltage reference IC 




Temperature measurement and film surface ignition 
 
Temperature measurements were made using two fine bare wire (0.13 mm dia.) k type 
thermocouples to provide rapid response and minimise thermal lag. The thermocouple 
outputs were amplified using an AD595 thermocouple amplifier to give a linearised 
output of 10 mV/°C. One of the thermocouples (T1) was placed between the sac/balloon 
and the pendulum for the purpose of triggering the oscilloscope after an explosion. The 
second (T2) was placed under a layer of polymer film (0.37 mm thick glove material). 
The glove material test pieces (20 x 40 mm) were attached to the front of the pendulum 
with a thin layer of adhesive putty to represent the presence of facial skin or its protective 
cover. A small section of the film was allowed to overhang the edge of the putty to  
maximise the chance of realizing ignition or physical damage.  
 
Acoustic measurements for noise exposure assessment 
 
Acoustic measurements were made to determine peak sound pressure levels at the 
proximate head position. These were carried out using a fully calibrated sound level 
meter (SLM): Norsonics-140 conforming to BS EN 60804: 2001 [22] Class I of SLM. To 
avoid the possibility of instrument damage, measurements of LCpeak were taken at a 
distance 4.2 m (in an unimpeded line of sight) from the point of an exploding sac/balloon 
(Figure 3). LCpeak levels at the assumed distance of 0.6 m (i.e. approximate arms length) 
between the unprotected ear of the employee and the center of the exploding bag were 
predicted using room acoustics theory taking into account reverberation time data for the 
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laboratory.  The necessary reverberation time measurements and calculations were made 
in accordance with BS ISO 3382-2: 2008 [23] using the SLM. 
  
 
Figure 3. Plan view of the peak sound pressure level measurement arrangement showing 
the laboratory dimensions and distances between the SLM and exploding sac/balloon 






Data logging the measurements 
 
The outputs from the pressure sensor, thermocouples and accelerometer were recorded 
using a 4 channel 100 MHz mixed signal storage oscilloscope (Agilent Technologies 
Model MSO-X 3014A) to enable capture of data. It was found that the most reliable 
option for triggering the oscilloscope reading was to activate it on the leading edge 
response of the thermocouple T1.  
 
Experimental methodology  
  
Tests were conducted in a straightforward sequence. Firstly the solenoid valve was 
opened and the hydrogen and air flow meters adjusted to give the required concentration. 
After closing the valve and positioning a sac or balloon in place, the solenoid valve was 
opened again and the sac/balloon filled. The oscilloscope was then set to wait for trigger 
until the high speed camera was triggered manually prompted by ignition of the gas 
mixture. Finally, measurement data was collected and the high speed digital images 
examined using Olympus "De-luxe" i-speed tracking software to calibrate and analyse the 
movement of the pendulum plate. This also enabled an estimate to be made of the 
duration of the explosion event, of great importance as discussed earlier in the context of 
HIC. The logged data was analysed to obtain peak pressure values, accelerations and 





4. Results  
 
Since sacs made of relatively un-elastic material are more likely to be representative of 
the flexible gas containing vessels used in the nuclear/process industries, zip-tie 
polyethylene sacs were used for the majority of the experiments filled to a capacity of 3.3 
litres. Rubber balloons were also used to give some information and understanding of 
how elastic containers, which forcibly contract from the gas mixture on puncturing, 
influence the explosion hazard. These were filled to a capacity of approximately 4 litres 
which, allowing for the elastic properties of the balloon material would have resulted in 
an internal pressure 2-4% above atmospheric. The plastic protection suit material used by 
process operatives was simulated using polymer glove material (0.037 mm thick) directly 
covering and in contact with thermocouple T2. 
   
Tests with the 5kg pendulum  
 
Tests were first carried out using the 5 kg pendulum to simulate the mass and cross 
sectional area of a human head with the pressure sensor located in position A (Fig. 2) to 
register the overpressure produced by ignition of gas mixture in a sac. From the high 
speed digital imaging it was apparent that the deflagration event lasted for some 20 ms 
and that the flames and combustion products clearly impinged on the pendulum and the 
polymer film. No movement was detected of the pendulum resulting from the blast as can 
be seen from the selected image frames of the ignition progress given in Figure 4. This 
was confirmed by the lack of any acceleration force registered by the accelerometer.  The 
pressure time history of the ignition in Fig.5 shows an initial positive peak of 0.4 kPa 
which rapidly goes negative indicating a suction phase before rapidly returning to 
atmospheric pressure. It should be noted that the zero time on the plot is referenced to the 
temperature response and as such does not directly correlate with the times of the images 
given in Fig.4. The temperature response (T2) as recorded on the underside of the 
polymer glove material (Fig. 6), shows that even though the digital images reveal 
combustion flames impinging on the material, the temperature rise is only approximately  
3ºC. Furthermore, inspection of the film after the test did not indicate any sign of 
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Figure 4. Image frames from ignition of stoichiometric H2/air mixture in zip-tie sac with 
the 5 kg pendulum. 
 















Figure 5. Pressure-time history for ignition of stoichiometric H2/air mixture in zip-tie sac 













Figure 6.  Temperature (T2) rise-time history for ignition of stoichiometric H2/air mixture 
in zip-tie sac with 5kg pendulum.  
 
  Tests were then carried out under similar conditions substituting balloons for the zip-tie 
sacs. It can immediately be seen from Figure 7, which shows image frames from the high 
speed video, that there are significant differences in the explosions with balloons and zip-
tie sacs. With the zip-tie sacs, the flames and combustion products are very clearly 
directed away from the point of ignition whereas with balloons the skin of the balloon 
retracts very rapidly leaving a ball of pre-mixed flammable atmosphere which ignites to 
produce a flame extending more evenly in all directions. The peak temperature recorded 
by the thermocouple between the balloon and pendulum was approximately 550 ºC. For a 
beaded thermocouple with even such fine wire as used here (0.13 mm) thermal lag is still 
significant with a time constant of around 0.135 s [24]. Since the period of temperature 
rise during the explosion was around 100 ms and that of the visible flaming 90 ms, the 
time constant implies that substantially less than 50% of the instantaneous temperature 
rise would have been recorded. Taking into account this difference it is unsurprising that 
the recorded temperature is much smaller than the adiabatic flame temperature for a 
stoichiometric hydrogen/air mixture (2483K). Figures 8 and 9 show the data recorded 
from the pressure sensor (position A) and thermocouple behind the polymer film.  The 
pressure time history is similar to that observed for the zip-tie sacs but the initial positive 
impulse is greater (1.13 kPa) consistent with the effect of a less directional blast on the 
transducer in position A. As with previous zip-tie sac tests, only a small temperature rise 
(1.5ºC) was detected behind the polymer film and the accelerometer did not record any 
acceleration of the pendulum. It can be seen from Fig. 9 that there was an initial rapid 
temperature rise of 0.5ºC over a period of 100 ms coinciding with the duration of the 
temperature rise recorded by the other thermocouple. Unlike the zip-tie sac tests, the 
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Figure 7. Image frames from the ignition of stoichiometric H2/air mixture in a balloon 
























           
 
Figure 8.  Pressure-time history for ignition of stoichiometric H2/air mixture in a balloon 
with the 5kg pendulum. Pressure sensor in position A.  
 
 










Figure 9. Temperature (T2) rise time history for ignition of stoichiometric H2/air mixture 









Tests with the 0.8 kg pendulum 
 
  Since no movement of the 5 kg pendulum was detected in the experiments, a further 
series of tests with gas filled zip-tie sacs were carried out with the much lighter Perspex 
disc (0.8 kg) and locating a pressure sensor in position B to determine the blast pressure 
close to the pendulum (simulated head position). The image frames for ignition of a gas 
filled zip-tie sac and the 0.8 kg pendulum (Fig. 10) show that the general progression of 
the explosion appears similar to that which occurs with the 5 kg pendulum. Although it 
cannot easily be seen from the still images, analysis of the high speed video indicated 
significant movement of the 0.8 kg pendulum with some superimposed vibration. 
Tracking of the markers on the pendulum indicated that the blast rapidly accelerated the 
pendulum to a stable net directional velocity of 0.16 m/s over a period of a few 
milliseconds. Consistent with data recorded from the accelerometer, this suggests that the 
blast force could result in an initial net directional acceleration of about 5g. The 
accelerometer measurements also showed that the initial net unidirectional acceleration 
was followed by a (net zero) fluctuating acceleration of up to around ± 6g.  
 
             
0ms 3ms
5ms 10ms
15ms 20ms  
Figure 10. Image frames from ignition of stoichiometric H2/air mixture in a zip-tie sac 
with the 0.8kg pendulum. 
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The pressure time history recorded for the sensor in position B indicated that the initial 
acceleration of the pendulum coincided with an impulsive pressure peak of 
approximately 1kPa followed by high frequency oscillations. As with previous tests only 
a small increase of temperature (T2) was recorded. 
 
 Finally, several tests were carried out using heavy duty sacs of the kind used in some 
storage operations in the UK nuclear industry. These sacs, of similar volume to the lighter 
zip-tie sacs (0.02 mm thick), comprised two 0.3 mm thick sheets of PVC seam welded on 
all sides. Figure 11 shows a sequence of still images from the video of a typical test using 
these sacs. It can be seen that the much thicker sac has made a significant difference to 
the nature of the explosion. Following ignition there is an extended time period during 
which a jet flame burns which then after 33 ms extends far enough to heat thermocouple 
T1. This longer duration, compared to the thinner bags, possibly relates to a slightly 
higher initial internal pressure. After 209 ms the flame can be seen to blow back into the 
sac and it was apparent that the ejected combustion products/flame was confined to a 
narrower jet than hitherto and appeared more violent. After the explosion, the area of the 
hole was only around 1.2 x 10-3 m2 whereas with the thinner zip-tie sacs the hole was 
around 6 to 11 x 10-3 m2. This is consistent with a considerably higher pressure being 
developed within the PVC sac. 
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0 ms 33 ms
209 ms 212 ms
216 ms 217 ms
220 ms 226 ms   
     
Figure 11. Image frames from ignition of stoichiometric H2/air mixture in a thick PVC 






From the movement of the markers on the pendulum, shown in Figure 12, it was found 
that the pendulum was accelerated rapidly away from the blast to a velocity exceeding 1 
m/s, considerably greater than that observed with the zip-tie sacs. It was also evident 
from the tracking measurements, that the initial acceleration to give this stable velocity 
occurred over a time period of around 6-7 ms which indicated an average initial 
acceleration of the pendulum in the region of 22g. This observation is consistent with the 
typical acceleration force - time history for these tests, shown in Figure 13, where there is 
an initial period of uni-directional acceleration force. Rapid fluctuation of pendulum 
movement is smoothed out due to the inertial tendency to resist sudden changes in its 
current momentum. The accelerometer records the effect of acceleration force on the 
























Figure 12. Movement of the 0.8kg pendulum resulting from ignition of stoichiometric 




































Figure 13. Acceleration force - time history for the 0.8kg pendulum after ignition of 
stoichiometric H2/air mixture in a thick PVC sac. 
  
 Figure 14 shows the output from the pressure sensor located close to the initial position 
of the pendulum. Comparison with Figure 13 suggests that the initial acceleration of the 
pendulum coincides with the arrival of the initial impulsive pressure peaks. Following the 
initial peak of around 1to 1.5 kPa the pressure trace becomes complex with high 
frequency oscillations, followed by several large spikes the largest of which peaks at 
nearly 12 kPa. 
 





















Figure 14. Time history for pressure (position B) developed near the pendulum (0.8 kg) 
after ignition of stoichiometric H2/air mixture in a thick PVC sac. 
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Figure 15 shows the temperature recorded during a test on the underside of the 0.037mm 
thick glove material. There is an initial rise of around 4°C followed by a slight decay 
before slowly starting to rise again ending at a rise of around 3°C after 1.5 seconds.  
 













Figure 15. Polymer film temperature rise (T2) after ignition of stoichiometric H2/air 
mixture in a thick PVC sac. 
 
Noise exposure tests 
 
The results of the acoustics measurements and corresponding predictive calculations of 
peak sound pressure levels at 0.6 m (arm’s length) distance from the exploding 
balloon/sac are given in Table 1. Due to the prevalence of a diffuse sound field in the 
laboratory the sound levels predicted at arm’s length distance are 3.4 dB higher than 
those measured at 4.2 m distance. Two explosion tests were carried out in each case for 
the balloons, zip-tie sacs and thick PVC sacs. The LCpeak dB values given in the Table 
are referenced to 20 µPa and exposure limit or action values of the EU Directive (noise) 
are indicated when the corresponding LCpeak value is predicted to be reached. The lower 
exposure action value applies when a LCpeak value of 135dB is reached and requires the 
employer to inform, instruct and train employees on the potential risks to health and 
safety due to the noise exposure. The exposure limit value recorded for one of the PVC 
sacs indicates a peak sound pressure level which is not permissible.     
 
Table 1. Peak sound pressure level (LCpeak, dB) and European Directive (noise) 
exposure limit and exposure action values. 
 
 Measured at 4.2 m Calculated at 0.6 m European Directive exposure 
limit and Action values 
Balloon           123.6           127.0  
Balloon           131.7           135.1 Lower exposure action value 
Zip-tie sac           126.8           130.2  
Zip-tie sac           126.6           130.0  
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PVC sac           132.2           135.6 Lower exposure action value 




For the reasons given earlier, tests were conducted to investigate three main possible 
types of injury, namely; physical injury from the force of the blast, burn damage and 
hearing damage resulting from the blast/shock wave. Considering first the shock loads 
imparted by the blast from the weakly confined, small volume deflagrations, it seems 
very unlikely that the loads generated would be sufficient to cause significant physical 
injury. With the heavier pendulum, similar in mass to a human head, no response was 
recorded by the accelerometer in any of the tests and no visual movement of the 
pendulum was observed from the digital imaging. Tests with the much lighter pendulum 
show movement in the digital imaging together with corresponding accelerometer 
readings. The stable net directional velocity of 0.16 m/s observed from the digital 
imaging over a period of a few milliseconds indicated that the pendulum movement with 
the zip-tie sac was associated with a blast force that resulted in a net unidirectional 
acceleration of around 5g. Given the short duration of this acceleration period and that a 
human head with 6 times the mass of the lighter pendulum would be subject to less 
acceleration force given a similar applied loading, it can be seen from Fig.1 that the blast 
is very much below that considered likely to cause serious injury/concussion.  
 
The tests carried out using the much thicker and stronger Sellafield supplied sacs, 
however, produced significantly greater shock loads. The accelerometer in one of these 
tests registered a maximum for a very short period that exceeded 30g (Figure 13) and the 
pendulum was accelerated to just over 1 m/s (i.e. around 5-6 times  greater than with the 
zip-tie sac tests). Again, had the heavier pendulum been used, the initial averaged 
unidirectional acceleration would have clearly been much less than that indicated (22g) 
and so considerably less than would be required to cause personal injury. It should be 
noted however, that the thicker sacs can clearly withstand a significant overpressure (as 
evidenced by the smaller area bursting/vent hole), so that should an ignition occur inside 
the sac prior to puncture, the blast on bursting could be much greater. The proximate 
head pendulum used in the study is also only representational and not biofidelic in respect 
to shape and internal head features. 
 
Regarding the possibility of burn damage, this seems very unlikely from the results of 
this study. Although flames/hot gases clearly impinged on the polymer film, it was for a 
very short time and there were no signs of damage/burning of the film sample used in any 
of the tests. Part of the film sample had been deliberately allowed to overhang the 
mounting putty to leave a free edge vulnerable to ignition. The flame temperatures would 
likely (noting the thermocouple time constant) have peaked well in excess of that 
required to start to melt/ignite the material (ca 200 – 500°C) but for only a very short 
time period. The heat flux to the polymer surface during this time would be as a result of 
both convection and radiation and will vary over the course of the explosion.  The 
temperatures recorded on the underside of the polymer glove film showed a maximum 
temperature rise in the polyethylene zip-tie sac tests of only 2.4°C. In the case of the 
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thicker Sellafield PVC sac tests the maximum temperature rise was 4°C. This is clearly 
insufficient to cause burn damage to flesh in contact with the glove material.   
 
The acoustic measurements and noise exposure assessment carried out in this study 
clearly suggest that hearing damage could result from the ignition of small volumes of 
hydrogen/air gas mixture. Although the sound levels recorded in the case of the thin zip-
tie sacs were lower than that which would be required to trigger action under European 
regulations, this was not the case with the thick PVC sacs. Assessing the predicted levels 
at arm’s length against the relevant European Directive (noise), the two instances of gas 
ignition in the PVC sacs reached action values whilst one of the rubber balloon 
explosions reached the lower exposure action limit. Given that the predicted sound levels 
would significantly increase at shorter than full arm’s length distance, with larger sacs or 
with increase in oxygen concentration, the possibility of hearing damage should be 
considered the most likely threat to the health of operatives subjected to the ignition of 
small volumes of weakly contained hydrogen/air gas mixture.  
 
Finally, it must be emphasized that the findings in this study relate to the ignition of 
weakly confined flammable gas mixture and that the consequences of strongly confined 
gas explosions could be considerably more injurious. Taking into account, the work of 
Vernon and Gee [20] it is also apparent that the consequences arising from ignition with 
increased oxygen content in the sacs are likely to be more serious than reported in this 





A study has been conducted to investigate the potential for injury from ignition of small 
weakly confined volumes (~3-4 litres) of hydrogen/air ( = 1) in close proximity to an 
operator. Given the nature of the personal protective equipment that would be expected to 
be employed by such operators as a matter of course (i.e. of significantly thicker material 
than the film employed in these tests) it is concluded that the risk of injury from burns is 
likely to be very small. Similarly, the measurements obtained regarding blast pressures 
and acceleration forces suggest that even for the worst case scenario investigated (i.e. 
with thick PVC sacs) there is unlikely to be any direct physical injury. The situation that 
would arise with strongly contained gas mixtures, with ignition initiated within the 
package or with the possibility of shrapnel fragments has not been investigated in this 
study but would be expected to lead to quite different findings. It has been shown, 
however, that even with weakly confined explosions, the possibility that hearing damage 
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